Following the program of April 2, 2012 at NYU, dedicated to Giovanni Palatucci, and, more generally, to the relation between history and national or religious myth, we would like to summarize some of the critical points that emerged during the discussion. Panelist included historians Marco Coslovich, biographer of Palatucci and Mordecai Paldiel, former director of the Institute of the Righteous at Yad Vashem at the time of Palatucci’s recognition. The program was conducted by Alessandro Cassin, deputy director of Centro Primo Levi.

Our hope is that this resource will provide tools to contextualize information that is often complex and multilayered.

The name of Giovanni Palatucci was first heard in the US, shortly after the controversial award presented by the Anti Defamation League to then Prime Minister Silvio Berlusconi, whose circumstances were well described by the late Nobel laureate Franco Modigliani in the New York Times. Berlusconi had stated that Mussolini had not murdered anybody, but just sent some Italians “vacation camps”. Modigliani had experienced Fascism and he knew what the “vacation camps” were. He saw clearly that there was an attempt to downplay the responsibilities of Fascist Italy and that an American Jewish organization was called upon to support the case.

Interestingly, in the heroic epic of Palatucci, the same claim was made: he had a plan to save Jews in the bucolic Southern haven of Campagna, a “vacation camp” where his uncle, the local Bishop, gave them protection.

The fame of Palatucci arose to popular mythology thanks to celebrations coming from the Italian government and members of the Church, and sparked the enthusiasm of US institutions including the National Italian American Foundation, the Sons of Italy, the Anti Defamation League, Pave the Way, the Raoul Wallenberg Foundation, and even several universities whose staff seems to have only vague ideas about the history of Italy and is thus unaware of how this “celebration of goodness” skews it.

Among the ironies of the saga is that even in the literature produced for Palatucci’s beatification process, the recognition of Yad Vashem is always paraded as the ultimate certification of his deeds. Even though no one had verified the information, most people involved with the case seemed to believe that Palatucci was honored at Yad Vashem for saving 5,000 Jews.

In 2010 CPL placed an inquiry with the Institute of the Righteous and we received a kind reply with copies of all testimonies. A total of two, one dated 1956 which had been rejected because several degrees removed, and another, dated 1988 which had been accepted and considered sufficient for his recognition.

Thus Giovanni Palatucci was indeed helpful to some Jews, at least to Elena Berger Ashkenasy who testified, and to her husband. They had no connection to Campagna or the Bishop. Her husband survived in Ferramonti and the rest of her family was deported to Auschwitz trying to flee Fiume. Another testimony emerged, that of Olga Conforty to whom Palatucci gave a temporary visa as a courtesy to a colleague of the Italian army who had taken her and her family under his protection.

If between 1952 and 1988 only two direct testimonies emerged, what is the origin of numbers and connections that ask of us a leap of faith and a substantial departure from historical evidence? While some of his story could be read within the frame of current international diplomacy, its propagation is often due to simple lack of knowledge and access to proper documentation.

Today many documents are available to scholars detailing the expulsion and detention of foreign Jews in Italy. We owe access to these sources primarily to the work of the Center for Contemporary Jewish Documentation in Milan, and historians Michele Sarfatti, Liliana Picciotto and Carlo Spartaco Capogreco. In the past year, with outstanding dedication, Anna Pizzuti has made available online a complete database of official records concerning the internment of foreign Jews in Italy.

What records show is that the actions of Palatucci are likely to be limited to a handful of cases and there is no evidence that he either saved hundreds or thousands Jews, nor that at the risk of his life he conducted any major rescue operation in agreement with his uncle, Giuseppe Maria Palatucci, who happened to be bishop in a village where the Fascist regime had established a detention camp for enemy aliens, primarily Jewish. He died in Dachau but he was not arrested for protecting Jews.

From these two direct testimonies, Palatucci emerges as a courteous and thoughtful person who never lost sight of the importance of solidarity and of helping people one at a time.

What follow is a list of factual errors and problematic elements recurring in the biographies of Giovanni Palatucci. We based each point on available records of which we indicate the source.

1. 1)Palatucci Chief of Police. Most biographies claim that Palatucci used his power as Chief of Police of Fiume to sign documents that saved Jews. In fact Giovanni Palatucci was never Chief of Police (Questore) of Fiume. As showed in his official file, he was an “adjunct deputy commissary”. He worked under two of the most anti-Semitic local figures of that time: Prefect Temistocle Testa and Chief of Police Vincenzo Genovese. Records and testimonies show that in Fiume Jews were rounded up with uncommon violence and DELASEM, the Italian Jewish Relief Organization, considered it one of the locations most in need, precisely because of the lack of cooperation of the Italian authorities. [Recds. Police of Fiume/Ministry of the Interior]
   

2. 2)Campagna and the rescue operation. There is no evidence that Palatucci and his uncle Bishop Giuseppe Maria Palatucci coordinated the rescue of thousands of Jews from Fiume by “deporting” them to Campagna. Palatucci had no power to sign internment orders which were signed by the Ministry of the Interior in Rome. The internment camp of Campagna was very small and functioned between July 1940 and September 1943. Its maximum capacity was of 370 people and most reports show that there were never more than 150-200 internees at a time. Over 3 years a total of 534 internees were detained in Campagna. Only 42 came from Fiume, 9 of whom were eventually deported. Records clearly contradict the claim of a concerted rescue operation on all counts. It should be added that the notion that deporting Jews to the South would save them, is mere hindsight. Jews interned in the South survived because the Allies landed there in 1943. There was no previous plan of the Italian authorities to send Jews to safety. They did not know and certainly did not wish that the South be occupied by the Allied. Moreover in 1942 the Bishop made an official requests to the Chief of Police in Rome, Carmine Senise, to remove the internees from Campagna: not the gesture of someone who leads a rescue plan. [Recds/Ministry of the Interior/State Archives of Fiume/CDEC]
   

3. 3)The 800 Refugees of the Agia Zoni. Contrary to the claim that Palatucci saved 800 Jewish refuges by alerting them to a Nazi conspiracy, hid them in Abbazia and helped them secretly board the Agia Zoni and flee, documents show that the Agia Zoni departed on May 17th from Fiume by order of Prefect Temistocle Testa after financial extortions and a negotiations with the Italian authorities concerning the number of passengers. The group (of 180 refugees) did not hide but was forced to stay at the luxurious Hotel Quisisana in Abbazia, under strict police surveillance and at its own expenses. It also should be noted that in 1939, there was no Nazi commando in Fiume and no Nazi ready to arrest the Jews. Fiume was part of the Kingdom of Italy and according to the Italian Racial Laws, all foreign Jews were to leave the country by March 12th. The following summary is based on documents from the Police of Fiume, the Italian Port Authority and the testimony of one of the organizers of the expedition. In 1939, a group of 180 Viennese Jews coordinated by the Jewish Agency of Zurich and Paris, hired a ship for 800 refuges of various provenance to flee to Palestine from the port of Fiume. When they arrived in Fiume, they found an old boat half of the capacity they had agreed upon. The Italian Port Authority held it in the port because it lacked safety equipment. The police forced the group to bank a substantial refurbishing of the ship after which they were able to depart. On March 17th, 1939  Prefect Testa informed the Ministry of the Interior that the Agia Zoni had departed with 459 passengers. These included 180 passengers who had been able to arrive in Fiume with German passports and other smaller groups that joined them fortuitously. According to police records, more than 600 refugees who had planned to emigrate with this expedition were rejected by the police at the Italian frontier. The Aghia Zoni landed in Palestine passing through Susak, Corfu, Crete, Athens, Naxos, Palestine. The event is extensively documented both in the police archives and by passengers’ accounts. There is no evidence that Palatucci had any role in it except for the implementation of some of Testa’s orders. [Recds./Ministry of the Interior/Fiume State Archives/Goldstein coll/Israel State Archives/CDEC]
   

4. 4)Arrest and deportation to Dachau. In 1943 the Germans established the Adriatisches Kustenland under the command of Friedrick Reiner. The entire leadership of the Questura of Fiume left. Testa and Genovese went to Rome. Palatucci remained as “regent” with few policemen, no mandate from the RSI and no power from the German command (they took his telephone and all weapons). The Germans questioned Palatucci on a financial issue and on the possession of the English copy of the Rubini Memorandum not on the records of the Jews. The accusation concerned an English document used by a local a fascist fringe, in an attempt to negotiate with the British the independence of Fiume. The certificate of arrest signed by Herbert Kappler and the file of the Italian Ministry of the Interior state clearly that the reason for the deportation is the transmission of documents to enemy intelligence.
   

5. 5)The deportation of the Jew of the Carnaro. Palatucci’s biographers claim that after the armistice he destroyed the records of the “ufficio stranieri” thus saving hundreds or thousands of Jews from deportation. It is difficult to trace the origin of this information. The story is unlikely in the light of the fact that almost 5,000 files of Jews are neatly preserved in the “Fondo Questura” of the State archive of Rjieka. Moreover, most accounts of Palatucci’s deeds imply that there was little or no deportation in Fiume. On the contrary the percentage of  Jews deported from Fiume is considerably higher than that if other Italian cities. According to the 1943 census of the Questura the Jews still residing in the Carnaro were 570 from the roughly 1,400 recorded in 1938. Arrests were conducted by the Germans starting in January 1944 based on the census of the Italian police. 412 Jews were deported, of whom 169 in the province and 240 in the city. This means that a city of 50,000 people with a collaborative regent of police was not able to hide 500 Jews. These data sets the factual context to the alleged actions of Giovanni Palatucci and should be evaluated carefully to assess the likelihood of those actions rather than being dismissed by accepting them acritically. [Recds/Ministry of the Interior/Police of Fiume/German State Archives/CDEC]